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VIOLENT MOTION PICTURES
The Censorship of Violent Motion Pictures:
A Constitutional Analysis
Violence in motion pictures and television shows has recently become an
issue in the courts and legislatures. For example, in Florida, a youth charged
with murder offered the defense of temporary insanity resulting from wat-
ching television.1 In California, a plaintiff in a tort action against a television
network sought damages for injuries allegedly inflicted upon her by juveniles
imitating a scene of brutality in a television drama. 2 In Chicago, the City
Council in 1976 amended an ordinance3 in order to set up a procedure for
censoring violent motion pictures for audiences under eighteen years of age. 4
The existence of the Chicago ordinance, plus the public concern over
controversially violent media, necessitates an inquiry into the constitutionality
of censoring violent motion pictures. Although the censorship of obscene mo-
tion pictures is constitutional if done by means of a system with procedural
'The Indianapolis Star, Oct. 1, 1977 at 5, col. 1.2 Olivia N. v. N.B.C., Inc., 46 U.S.L.W. 2265 (Cal. App. 1977).
'CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 155-1 to 155-7.4 (1969).
41d., at § 155.5. The amendments [hereinafter referred to as Chicago Ordinance] read in
part:
155-1. It shall be unlawful for any person to show or exhibit in a public place, or
in a place where the public is admitted anywhere in the city, any motion picture,
whether an admission fee is charged or not, without first having secured a permit
therefor from the Superintendent of Police.
155-1 It shall be the duty of the Superintendent of Police to refuse to issue such
permit if the motion picture, considered as a whole, is harmful [obscene] when viewed
by children, as defined herein.
The term "children" means any persons less than eighteen years of age.
"Harmful when viewed by children" means "obscene when viewed by children" or
"violent when viewed by children," as those terms are defined below.
A. A motion picture is "obscene when viewed by children" when taken as a whole
it (1) to the average child, applying contemporary community standards, appeals to
the prurient interest, (2) depicts or describes in a patently offensive way sexual conduct
as defined herein, and (3) lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Each of these three elements shall be applied in terms of what the adult community
judges is appropriate for children.
B. A motion picture is "violent when viewed by children" (1) when its theme or plot is
devoted primarily or substantially to patently offensive deeds or acts of brutality or
violence, whether actual or simulated, such as but not limited to assaults, cuttings,
stabbings, shootings, beatings, sluggings, floggings, eye gougings, brutal kicking, burn-
ings, dismemberments and other reprehensible conduct to the persons of human beings
or to animals and (2) which, when taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.
Both of these elements shall be applied in terms of what the adult community,
applying contemporary, standards, judges is appropriate for children.
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safeguards, 5 the Supreme Court has not decided whether violent motion pic-
tures can be censored. 6 This note will examine whether traditional modes of
First Amendment analysis - nonprotected categories of speech, balancing, and
the current version of the clear and present danger test-can justify such cen-
sorship, and as an aid in deciding the legal issue of censorship, recent social
science research on the effects of viewing violent media will be reviewed.
DEFINING VIOLENCE OUT OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S PROTECTION
The first amendment states that "Congress shall make no law ... abridg-
ing the freedom of speech . . .", and "speech" includes motion pictures."
Although this phrasing of the first amendment sounds absolute, it has not
been interpreted to protect all speech; some categories of speech, such as
obscenity and fighting words, clearly lie outside of its protection. 9 Until
recently, commercial speech ° and group libel" were also considered un-
protected. If violent movies could fit into a nonprotected category or be
recognized as a new category of nonprotected speech, such media would be
susceptible to censorship or other legislative control.' 2
Violence Outside Established Categories of Nonprotected Speech
It would seem that violent expression cannot be strained to fit into the
two established categories of nonprotected speech, obscenity and fighting
words. Obscenity is limited by the Supreme Court to "works which depict or
5Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Time Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365
U.S. 43 (1961).
6The Supreme Court did review a case involving an ordinance permitting classification of
violent movies as unsuitable for young persons, but decided the case on vagueness grounds. In-
terstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968). See text accompanying note 87 infra.
'U.S. CONT. amend. I.
sJoseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
'Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942).
1OValentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
"Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
12If censorship of violent media is constitutionally permissible, the censorship process must
include certain procedural safeguards. First, the burden or proving that the film is unprotected
must rest on the censor. Although the State may require advance submission of films, the re-
quirement cannot lend an effect of finality to the censor's determination. Only a judicial deter-
minaion suffices to impose the final restraint. Thus, the censor, within a short specified period
must either issue a license or go to court. In addition, the procedure must assure a prompt final
judicial decision. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1964).
The Chicago ordinance appears to include such sageguards. CHICAGO ORDINANCE. suprr
note 4, at § 155-5, 155-7.1, 155-7.2. The Superintendent of Police is the initial censor. If he
refuses to issue a permit, a Motion Picture Appeal Board must review the decision within five
days. If the Board affirms the Superintendent's decision, the Board must file with a court an ac-
tion for an injunction within three days. Assuming that such filing will lead to a prompt judicial
determination in which the Board must bear the burden of proof, Freedman's requirements are
satisfied. See Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968).
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describe sexual conduct,"' 3 and the Court expressly declined to include
violence within that category in Winters v. New York,14 which struck down as
void for vagueness a definition of obscenity and indecency that included
"stories of deeds of bloodshed or lust, so massed as to become vehicles for in-
citing violent and depraved crimes against the person."15 In apparent recogni-
tion of this distinction between obscenity and violence, drafters of the
Chicago ordinance provided separate definitions for movies which are
"obscene when viewed by children" and for movies which are "violent when
viewed by children.' 6 Thus, violence does not fall within the nonprotected
category of obscene speech.
If movies trigger a physically violent reaction, perhaps they are "fighting
movies," synonymous with nonprotected "fighting words" "which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.' ' 7
However, the fighting words exception to the first amendment stems from the
need to avoid fights or insults hurled at policemen, and has little relevance to
movie-watching, which involves no face-to-face confrontation or personal in-
sultes.' 8 The nonprotected category of fighting words thus does not accom-
modate the violence clasification either.
Violence as a New Category of Nonprotected Speech
Although distinct from existing nonprotected speech, violent expression
may warrant recognition as a new category of nonprotected speech, par-
ticularly if such expression is of slight social value or devoid of ideas.' 9 The
ingredients of a nonprotected category of speech include:
"Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
"Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
"Id. at 518. Winters invalidated § 1141(2) of the New York Penal Law entitled "Obscene
prints and articles." A commentator notes that "Winters also struck in a subtle way at the ra-
tionale of obscenity regulation itself. . . . By containing the remedy, the Justices expressed doubt
about the disease." Krislov, From Ginzburg to Ginsberg: The Unhurried Children's Hour in
Obscenity Litigation, 1968 Sup. Cr. REv. 153, 159 [hereinafte cited as Krislov].
"CHICAGO ORDINANCE. supra note 4, at § 155.5. See note 4 supra.
17Chaplinsky y. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
"The recent offensive speech cases make clear the narrow focus of the fighting words
category of unprotected speech. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) reversed a conviction for
disturbing the peace based on Cohen's wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft." Mr.
Justice Harlan explained that the expression was not obscene, since not erotic, that it was not
equivalent to fighting words, as it was "not directed to the person of the hearer" and no in-
dividual could reasonably have regarded the words as a direct, personal insult, that it was not a
proper exercise of the police power to prevent a speaker from provoking a group to a hostile
reaction, and that it was not a captive audience situation. The Court thus drew a line of con-
stitutional protection around such expression. As a result, a very narrow category of "fighting
words," limited to personal insults in a face-to-face confrontation which could trigger physical
violence, remains nonprotected. Rutzick, Offensive Language and the Evolution of First Amend-
ment Protection, 9 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 8 (1974). Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518
(1972), further emphasizes how narrowly drawn this category of speech must be. In Gooding, a
statute using the terms "opprobrious words" and "abusive language" was deemed invalid for over-
breadth, as the construction of these terms was not confined to fighting words.
19"[lImplicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly
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the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
"fighting" words -those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace .... [S]uch utterances are no essen-
tial part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.2 0
To assess whether violent media lacks social importance, and is therefore
outside first amendment protection, one must examine the policies or societal
interests promoted by regulation of violent media. Relevant interests may in-
clude: (1) the prevention of antisocial conduct, (2) the unwillingness to ad-
vocate immoral behavior, and (3) avoidance of revolting public displays.2 1
The prevention of antisocial conduct is a primary interest underlying the
regulation of violent expression, for antisocial conduct triggered by depictions
of violence could culminate in overt, destructive, and criminal acts. Some
members of the public apparently blame the media for murders and other
crimes of violence.2 2 However, proof of a causal connection should be re-
quired to remove the protection of the First Amendment, 23 and so far, con-
without redeeming social importance" and thus "not within the area of constitutionally protected
speech or press." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). A similar premise might be
accepted with regard to violent expression.2
*Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (emphasis added).
"1These social interests are modeled on those posed as justifications for obscenity regulation.
Notes one commentator in regard to obscenity:
"Analysis reveals four possible evils: (1) the incitement to antisocial sexual conduct; (2)
psychological excitement resulting from sexual imagery; (3) the arousing of feelings of
disgust and revulsion; and (4) the advocacy of improper sexual values."
Kalven, The Meta Physics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 4-5 [hereinafter cited
as Kalven]. All such interests, when applied to obscenity, have come under fire from critics both
on the Court and off. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508-14 (1957) (dissenting
opinion, Douglas, J., joined by Black, J.); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
497-99 (1970) [hereinafter cited as EMERSON]. Kalven, supra, at 4.
Kalven summarizes,
It is hard to see why the advocacy of improper sexual values should fare differently, as
a constitutional matter, from any other exposition in the realm of ideas. Arousing
disgust and revulsion in a voluntary audience seems an impossibly trivial base for mak-
ing speech a crime. The incitement of antisocial conduct . . . evaporates in light of the
absence of any evidence to show a connection between the written word and overt sex-
ual behavior."
Id. Nevertheless, the interests, even if not universally accepted in regard to obscenity, may
become more compelling when applied to violent movies. As one commentator notes, "For every
justification for restricting sex candor, precisely analogous arguments could be developed with
respect to limiting flaunted violence." Krislov, supra note 15, at 159.
"See, e.g., Washington Post, Aug. 4, 1976, § A, at 11.
"1Critics of obscenity laws often point to the lack of empirical data to support the assump-
tion that obscenity triggers antisocial conduct. EMERSON. supra, note 21, at 498. But see Paris
Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60 (1973). Although the Supreme Court has made it clear
that it does not require such empirical proof for obscenity legislation, it does not necessarily
follow that it will not require proof for the censorship of violent expression. The force of history
no doubt makes it much easier for the Court to accept obscenity laws than to accept a whole new
area of speech regulation without proof of the need for it.
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clusive evidence of that causal connection is lacking. "4 Thus the interest
espoused does not support the nonprotection desired.
The unwillingness to advocate immoral behavior is an interest apparently
aimed more at thoughts than at conduct. 25 Promoters of this interest might
be concerned with instilling negative attitudes in viewers by exposing them to
destructive models on the screen. 26 In other words, those who oppose the
media advocating violent behavior are concerned about putting ideas in
viewers' minds. Yet the first amendment's protection is designed to protect
"all ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox
ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opi-
nion .... "27 Thus, using this interest to avoid "bad ideas" would clash with
the "marketplace of ideas" concept 28 and would be rejected.
However, if the impact on "character" could eventually produce a change
in conduct, perhaps attempting to avoid advocating immoral behavior is not
altogether specious. 29 Whereas the first interest discussed seeks to prevent im-
mediate antisocial conduct, this second interest attacks gradually emerging
antisocial behavior; again, substantiating evidence would make the argument
more convincing.
The avoidance of revolting public displays may also seem a specious in-
terest at first blush. As a commentator states in reference to obscene movies,
"arousing disgust and revulsion in a voluntary audience seems an impossibly-
trivial base for making speech a crime."30 Yet revulsion at sexual scenes on
24See text accompanying notes 32 & 33 infra.
25EMFRSON, supra note 21, at 499.21Two social scientists comment:
Some individuals who are opposed to the depiction of violence on television are not
concerned chiefly with the possbility that the adult viewer will himself go out and
shoot a neighbor or that the child who enjoys "Batman" will kick the family dog.
Many critics of what they consider excessive programming of violence are well aware of
the social constraints which usually keep children and adults alike from injuring each
other often or seriously. They are more concerned with the attitudes which televisions
may be inculcating and the emotional responses which it may be engendering.
Specifically, they point to the fact that most television programs involving violence in-
clude a good guy or guys who, in the name of "my" country, "our" side, or law and
order, inflict injury or death on the bad guys.... The result of being exposed to such
attitudes, it is argued, is not particularly violence on the part of the viewer but the in-
creased probability that he will support, condone, or justify aggression on the parts of
his own police department or armed forces.
S. FESHBACH & R. SINGER. TELEVISION AND AGGRESSION 18 (1971).
17Roth v. United States, 554 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). Kingsley International Pictures v.
Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959), makes it clear that a state cannot prevent the exhibition of a mo-
tion picture because that picture advocates an idea.
"Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2
'Kalven, supra note 21, at 4. Mr. Justice Harlan seemed to rely on this gradual effect on
conduct as a justification for obscenity laws. He stated in Roth v. United States, "[t]he State can
reasonably draw the inference that over a long period of time the indiscriminate dissemination of
materials, the essential character of which is to degrade sex, will have an eroding effect on moral
standards." 343 U.S. at 502 (Harlan, J., concurring). But see EMERSON, supra note 21, at 499.
"Kalven, supra note 21, at 4.
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the screen may be of a lesser- magnitude than revulsion at watching the
dismemberment of a human being.31 Depicting the brutal destruction of
human beings for the sake of entertainment and commercial gain could strike
too deeply at shared societal values. Whether governmental sanction of
noninterference with such displays will cause harm to society may be an
unanswerable question, but the specter of such harm may be enough to
justify some regulation of grossly violent and brutal movies. Empirical
research studying the effects of viewing violent media may help in deciding
whether this and the preceding interests discussed are strong enough to justify
setting up a new category of nonprotected speech.
A considerable number of studies on the effects of media violence on
children now exist . 2 Some focus on television violence, others on motion pic-
tures. Present knowledge on the effects of violent media is difficult to sum-
marize, partially because of the quantity of studies, but primarily because in-
terpreters of the same data often reach opposite conclusions." It is difficult to
5lSee generally New York Times, Mar. 7, 1976, § 2, at 13, col. 8; Feb. 27, 1976, at 21,
col. 12.
3t See, e.g., A. ARNOLD. VIOLENCE AND YOUR CHILD (1969); A. BANDURA. AGGRESSION: A
SOCIAL LEARNING ANALYSIS (1973); S. FESHBACH & R. SINGER. TELEVISION AND AGGRESSION (1971);
J. GOLDSTEIN, AGGRESSION AND CRIMES OF VIOLENCE (1975); D. HOWITT & G. CUMBERBATCH. MASS
MEDIA VIOLENCE AND SOCIETY (1975); VIOLENCE AND THE MASS MEDIA (0. Larsen ed. 1968).
As recently as 1970, a law journal writer remarked that "a few inconclusive studies have
been undertaken to determine the effect of motion pictures on children" and cited only two
studies which took place in the 1930's. Note, Private Censorship of Movies, 22 STAN. L. REV. 618,
643 (1970). The two studies are H. BLUMER & H. HAUSER. MOVIES, DELINQUENCY AND CRIME
(1933); W. HEALY & H. BRENNER. NEW LIGHT ON DELINQUENCY AND ITS TREATMENT (1936).
Since the writing of that 1970 note, volumes of studies on the subject have been published.
In part, this publication of research was due to the work of the 1969 National Commission on
the Causes and Prevention of Violence, and the Surgeon General's Scientific Advisory Committee
on Television and Social Behavior, which began in 1969 and completed its work in 1972. For the
relevant research collected by the Commission, see D. LANGE, R. BAKER & S. BALL. 9 MASS
MEDIA AND VIOLENCE (1969); 9A MASS MEDIA HEARINGS (1969). See SURGEON GENERAL'S ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON TELEVSIONS AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, TELEVISION AND GROWING UP: THE IMPACT OF
TELEVISION VIOLENCE (1972); 3 TELEVISION AND ADOLESCENT AGGRESSIVENESS (1972). At the same
time, behavioral scientists publihsed results of studies collected or conducted independently of the
government projects. See, e.g., A Bandura, supra; S. Feshbach & R. Singer, supra.
5 5One group of social scientists conclude that "[t]here is a clear and reliable relationship
between the amount of violence which a child sees on entertainment television and the degree to
which he is aggressive in his attitudes and behavior." Liebert, Davidson, & Neale, Aggression in
Childhood: The Impact of Television, in WHERE Do You DRAW THE LINE? (V. Cline ed. 1974)
119-20. Others declare that "the Mass Media do not have any significant effect on the level of
violence in society." D. Howitt & G. Cumberbatch, supra note 32, at vii. Examples of a few well-
known studies may help to reconcile these conflicting conclusions.
Albert Bandura has conducted several studies with very young children. See, e.g., Bandura,
Influence of Models' Reinforcement Contingencies on the Acquisition of Imitative Responses, 1 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. 589-95 (1965); Bandura, Ross, & Ross, Vicarious Reinforcement and
Imitative Learning, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH. 601-07 (1963); Bandura, Ross, & Ross, Imita-
tion of Film-Mediated Aggressive Models, 66 J. ADNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH. 3-71 (1963). His sum-
mary of one important study illustrates a social science laboratory experiment designed to test
whether children will adopt aggressive behavior portrayed by adult models in various situations.
The first group observed real-life adults ...
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In one corner [of the test room], the child found a set of play materials; in another
corner, he saw an adult sitting quietly with a set of tinker toys, a large inflated plastic
Bobo doll and a mallet. Soon after the child started to play with his toys, the adult
model began attacking the Bobo doll ...
The second group of children saw a movie of the adult model beating up the
Bobo doll. The third group watched a movie-projected through a television con-
sole-in which the adult attacking the doll was costumed as a cartoon cat. Children in
the fourth group did not see any aggressive models; they served as a control group.
At the end of 10 minutes the experimenter took each child to an observation
room, where we recorded his behavior. . . . [W]e mildly annoyed each child before he
came in.
The observation room contained a variety of toys. Some could obviously be used
to express aggression, while others served more peaceful purposes ...
Bandura, What TV Violence Can Do to Your Child, in VIOLENCE AND THE MASS MEnIA, supra
note 32, at 124-25. The study is Bandura, Ross & Ross, Imitation of Film-Mediated Aggressive
Models, supra.
Two important findings resulted from this study. Children who had observed the aggression
prior to being frustrated were more aggressive in their play than those who had not observed any
adult aggression. Further, the aggressive play was imitative, modeled on the behavior the
children had observed in adults, whether live or on film. The study is discussed in Siegel, The Ef-
fects of Media Violence on Social Learning, in Lange, Baker, & Ball, supra note 32, at 174-75.
Another study by Bandura utilized a five-minute film in which one man plays with attrac-
tive toys until another character, Rocky, aggressively takes the toys. Bandura, Ross & Ross,
Vicarious Reinforcement and Imitative Learning, supra. A commentator announced to the three
to five year old viewers that Rocky was the victor. Another film showed Rocky's aggressive
behavior severely punished. After viewing one film, children were observed in a play session.
Both Bandura studies illustrate "that young children imitatie the specific acts of aggression they
have observed. . . .This imitation occurs whether the dramatic presentation is realistic or fan-
tasylike. Imitation is enhanced if the aggression brings rewards to the adult who is observed and
minimized if the aggression brings punishment." Siegel, supra, at 276.
These conclusions appear definite. However, other social scientists argue that Bandura's fin-
dings are not relevant to actual violence outside of the laboratory setting, although Bandura is
respected for his methodology. See D. Howitt & Cumberbatch, note 32 supra. Their whole book
is devoted to illustrating how such studies are irrelevant to real-life violence.
Not all studies focus on young children in play situations, however. Several studies have
measured the aggression of college students who, after viewing certain films, believed they were
delivering electric shocks to confederates. E.g., Berkowitz, Some Aspects of Observed Aggres-
sion, 2 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCH. 359-69 (1965); Walters & Thomas, Enhancement of
Punitiveness by Visual and Audiovisual Displays, 16 CANADIANJ. PSYCH. 244-55 (1963). The films
offered apparent justification or additional incentive for delivery of the shocks. However, critics
are no more satisfied with this experimental design than with Bandura's.
The major criterion of aggression employed in most of the studies is the delivery of a
shock of high intensity to another student presumably as part of a learning experi-
ment. . . . It remains a serious question whether the delivery of the shock really is
analogous to an act of overt aggression. ... If E [experimenter] asked the frustrated S
[subject] to slap the other participant in the face or to whack him with a paddle we
might not get the same reaction. Conceivably by setting up a complex situation in
which S gets minimal feedback from his fellow player of distress and has every reason
to believe that a faculty member of a college would not permit him to harm anfone
seriously, the whole situation takes on a game-like atmosphere.
Singer, The Influence of Violence Portrayed in Television or Motion Pictures Upon Overt Ag-
gressive Behavior, THE CONTROL OF AGGRESSION AND VIOLENCE (J. Singer ed. 1971) at 45-46.
Such criticisms may be unavoidable in any laboratory setting. Therefore, field studies may
be more useful in proving whether violent media cause antisocial conduct. Feshbach and Singer
made an effort to employ laboratory procedures in a field context. S. Feshbach & R. Singer,
supra note 32. Their six-week study was carried out in the setting of three private schools and
four boys' residential institutions. The subjects, adolescent boys, were required to watch television
from one of two designated lists of programs. One list was an aggressive diet of shows, the other
1977-1978]
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generalize from studies based on different concepts to ultimately reach a
definition of aggression showing the relation between viewing media and the
actual occurrence of crime.3 4
To date, empirical research paints a gloomy picture of unprovable con-
clusions. Behavioral science currently does not allow conclusive proof that
violent movies precipitate crimes or cause serious harm to children to other
ways. Empirical data does not disprove either possibility, and in some cir-.
cumstances a tentative causal connection has been shown.35 But limited, ten-
tative conclusions from empirical research do not support creation of a new
category of nonprotected speech.
Additional reasons exist for keeping violent movies within the scope of the
first amendment. One reason is the lack of history or tradition of censoring
violent media.3 6 If anything, the appeal of war stories and the adventures of
nonaggressive. Daily behavior rating forms were completed for each child by supervisors or
teachers. Each aggressive act was rated, and personality inventories were also taken.(Methodological problems occurred, because some boys dropped out of the project and some
rates were very inconsistent.)
The data collected revealed no significant effect on peer aggression scores in the private
school population but showed marked effects in the boys' homes. "The significant decline in ag-
gression toward peers in the boys exposed to aggression content in televison and the increase in
aggression in the boys exposed to the control diet constitute the most important finding in the
study." Id. at 80-81. This result was interpreted to mean that an aggressive television diet pro-
vides "cognitive support," a coping function associated with aggressive fantasies. In other words,
the vicarious imaginative activity entailed in observing aggressive content on television leads to a
release of aggression. This resembles the "catharsis" hypothesis, which suggests that drive reduc-
tion from television or movie watching occurs and, therefore, that such viewing reduces real-life
violence. D. Howitt & G. Cumberbatch, supra at 32.
3'Feshbch and Singer clearly utilized different underlying concepts from Bandura;
Feshbach emphasizes fantasy and catharsis, while Bandura talks of observational learning and
imitation. See text accompanying note 33 supra. Another problem is the measure of aggression,
as the studies involve play situations and attacks on inanimate objects, with no demonstrated
relation to overt aggression and actual assault on another individual.
It remains an unanswered question whether aggressive play is at all the same as a
direct assault upon another child. Indeed there is evidence that one of the
characteristics of imaginative children is their capacity to engage in vigorous aggressive
play quite comparable to the situation occurring in the Bandura-type experiments....
It remains to be seen whether such play bears a direct relation to overt aggression.
Singer, The Influence of Violence Portrayed in Television or Motion Pictures Upon Overt Ag-
gressive Behavior, THE CONTROL OF AcGGRSSION AND VIOLENCE (J. Singer ed. 1971) at 38.
sThe Surgeon General's Scientific Advisory Committee on Television and Social Behavior
concluded that a causal connection does exist, finding:
A preliminary and tentative indication of a causal relation between viewing violence on
television and aggressive behavior, an indication that any such causal relation operates
only on some children (who are predisposed to be aggressive); and an indication that it
operates only in some environmental contexts. Such tentative and limited conclusions
are not very satisfying. They represent substantially more knowledge than we had two
years age, but they leave many questions unanswered.
Id., supra note 32, at 18-19.36See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Comment, Exclusion of Children from
Violent Movies, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1149 (1967).
The lack of a history of censoring violence is in contrast with the historical support for cen-
soring obscenity. In Roth v. United States, Justice Brennan gave great weight to history as a
[Vol. 53:381
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cowboys and Indians point to a history in support of such violent tales. The
1950's produced crime comic book legislation, aimed at censoring or limiting
distribution to minors of comics featuring crime;" 7 however, that legislation
does not support the Chicago ordinance inasmuch as the comic book laws
were struck down by courts's relying on Winters v. New York, s 9 the case
which rejected an attempt to censor violent publications. 40 More recently,
legislation censoring violent media was likewise rejected when an ordinance
censoring movies harmful to children was held void for vagueness in In-
terstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas.41
Support for constitutional protection of violent media may also be drawn
from the current erosion of traditional nonprotected categories of expression.
For example, New York Times v. Sullivan42 has been interpreted as signaling
an erosion of the "two-level approach" to speech, 43 which creates two
justification for excluding obscenity from constitutional protection. 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957).
Because libel laws and the crimes of blasphemy and profanity existed at the time the Constitution
was ratified, speech falling within such offenses was intended to be outside of the protection of
the first amendment. Although obscenity laws admittedly were not as well developed, obscene
speech likewise was intended to be nonprotected, according to Brennan, who reasoned, "As early
as 1712, Massachusetts made it criminal to publish 'any filthy, obscene, or profane song, pam-
phlet, libel, or mock sermon ... ' Thus, profanity and obscenity were related offenses." Id. at
482-83.
This historical argument has been criticized by commentators and by a Justice sitting in the
same case. See, e.g., Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 2
("Although it has been argued that the utterance of obscenity was a common-law crime, early in-
stances are infrequent and, at best, ambiguous.") Justice Douglas wrote, "Unlike the law of libel,
wrongfully relied on in Beauharnais, there is no special historical evidence that literature dealing
with sex was intended to be treated in a special manner by those who drafted the First Amend-
ment." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (dissenting opinion). Although the evidence of
laws contemporaneous with the ratification of the Constitution has been questioned, Justice Bren-
nan also made clear that more recent history supports his conclusion, by noting the existence of
obscenity laws in all the states. Roth v. United States, 340 U.S. at 485.
31See Comment, supra note 36, at 1161-62, for a summary of comic book legislation.
"See Police Comm'rs v. Siegel Enterprises, Inc., 233 Md. 110, 162 A.2d 727, cert. denied,
364 U.S. 909 (1960); Katzev v. County of Los Angeles, 52 Cal. 2d 360, 341 P.2d 310 (1959).
Katzev used the clear and present danger test.
39333 U.S. 507 (1948).
10Id. at 519. Yet simultaneously, the Winters court found obscenity legislation more accep-
table because history justified it. "They implied the 'grandfather clause' argument of Roth, which
exempted obscenity from the most piercing scrutiny of First Amendment standards." Krislov.
supra note 15, at 159.
"1390 U.S. 676 (1968). The City of Dallas enacted an ordinance establishing a Motion Pic-
ture Classification Board to classify films as suitable or not suitable for young persons. "Not
suitable" included "[d]escribing or portraying brutality, criminal violence or depravity in such a
manner as to be, in the judgment of the Board, likely to incite or encourage crime or delinquen-
cy on the part of young persons." Id. at 681-82. Student notes have discussed the decision and its
prior lower court opinions. See 33 ALB. L. REV. 173 (1968); 55 CALIF. L. REv. 926 (1967); Com-
ment, Exclusion of Children from Violent Movies, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1149 (1967); Note, Con-
stitutional Law-The Sale of Obscene Material to Minors, 37 U.M. KANSAS CITY L. REV. 127
(1969).
41376 U.S. 254 (1964).
'
5 Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on the Central Meaning of the First Amend-
ment, 1964 Sup. Cr. REv. 191, 217-18.
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categories: that which is worthy enough to require "the application of First
Amendment protection and that which is beneath First Amendment" con-
cerns. 44 Lower-level speech traditionally included fighting words,4 5 group
libel, 46 obscenity,47 and commercial speech. 4 Utilizing the traditional ap-
proach, the plaintiffs in New York Times argued that libel was lower-level,
not constitutionally protected, speech. Mr. Justice Brennan rejected the argu-
ment:
[W]e are compelled by neither precedent nor policy to give any more weight
to the epithet "libel" than we are to other "mere labels" of state law. . . .
Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace,
obscenity, solicitation of legal business, and the various other formulae for
the repression of expression that have been challenged in this Court, libel can
claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be
measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment.4 9
This statement may indeed signal the elimination of much lower-level
speech, as commercial speech and group libel are now placed back under the
protection of the first amendment.50 Even though obscenity and fighting
words may remain nonprotected categories, other broad categories of non-
protected speech have become less acceptable, so that creation of an
analogous category for violent speech would probably not be warmly
received.5'
The unacceptability of a broad category does not, however, preclude
441d. at 217.
4'Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
4"Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).4 tRoth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
"Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
49376 U.S. at 269 (footnotes omitted).
5OSee Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Vanasco v. Schwartz, 401 F.
Supp. 87 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), affd mem. sub. nom, Schwartz v. Vanasco, 423 U.S. 1041 (1976).
"But see Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), in which Mr. Justice
Stevens indicates that society's interest in some types of expresion is of a lesser magnitude than
the interest in expression at the core of the first amendment. The Justice states,
Morever, even though we recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate
the total suppression of erotic materials that have some arguably artistic value, it is
manifest that society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly dif-
ferent, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate that
inspired Voltaire's immortal comment. Whether political oratory or philosophical
discussion moves us to applaud or to despise what is said, every schoolchild can unders-
tand why our duty to defend the right to speak remains the same. But few of us would
march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see "Specified
Sexual Activities" exhibited in the theaters of our choice. Even though the First
Amendment protects communication in this area from total suppression, we hold that
the State may legitimately use the content of these materials as the basis for placing
them in a different classification from other motion pictures.
Id. at 70-71.
Where violent expression would fit into Mr. Justice Stevens' graduated approach to the first
amendment is not apparent.
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line-drawing or rule-making which does not attempt to create "talismanic im-
munity" for violent speech. Just as a "deliberate, calculated falsehood" re-
mains nonprotected,52 so might a narrow class of violent expression in certain
circumstances. Instead of carving out a broad category of nonprotected
speech, one may engage in a more refined "definitional balancing," which
"draws the constitutional line generically, by determining the meaning of
constitutional guarantees for different classes of situations."53
However, delineating a narrow class of violent expression and
distinguishing it from the violent expression which remains protected by the
first amendment is a difficult task. For instance "violent when viewed by
children" in the Chicago ordinance does not apparently create a narrow class
of violent expression.5 4 Instead, modeled on the definition of obscenity for-
mulated in Miller v. California,55 the Chicago definition includes violent
movies which lack serious artistic, political or scientific value.56 As an attempt
to accommodate free speech with the interests in preventing antisocial con-
duct and related harms, the Chicago formula is over-inclusive.
To avoid over-inclusiveness, the definition could be limited to violent
movies causing viewers to engage in actual violence and criminal acts.
Although this narrower definition may be less objectionable constitutionally,
it may be currently unworkable given the inconclusive results of empirical
studies attempting to relate violent media and crime. Separation of media in-
to causal and noncausal categories would be guesswork, risking intrusion of
censorship power into protected speech. This risk looms too large to warrant
classification of even this narrow class of expression as nonprotected.5 7
"
2New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
"Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and Present Danger:" From Schenck to Brandenburg-and
Beyond, 1969 SuP. Cr. REV. 41, 64. See Vanasco v. Schwartz, 401 F. Supp. 87, 95 (E.D.N.Y.
1975), affd 423 U.S. 401 (1976).
Laying down such rules of application is an approach which has gained much acceptability
since New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1963) was decided. That case established "a
federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood
relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice.'
376 U.S. at 279-80.
"See text infra at note 4.
55413 U.S. 15 (1973).
"CHICAGO ORDINANCE. supra note 4, at § 155.5(B).
61The Court of Appeals opinion in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 366 F.2d 590
(5th Cir. 1966), vacated, 390 U.S. 676 (1968), states,
As forceful as these arguments may be for the expansion of the scope of the
classification standards, the long history of the misuse of the censorship power con-
vinces us that the standard for classification must be restricted to the control of
obscenity. In considering the classification approach, we cannot ignore the activities of
the censors .... Because of the very real threat to the adult's freedom of speech and
expression, the Supreme Court has apparently limited censorship affecting adults to a
narrowly defined area of obscenity.
Id. at 598.
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Alternative Approach: Application of Danger Test
To allow limited censorship of violent media without the difficulty of
labeling such media as nonprotected, their protected status might be
recognized but at the same time made subject to the "clear and present
danger" test.5 8 Because a major concern in censoring violent media is the
prevention of antisocial, delinquent, or criminal acts, the public might well
consider such media dangerous. If this dangerous quality reaches certain legal
standards, the media in queston may be suppressed, not because it is by
definition outside of the first amendment, but because that which could be
protected speech may be so harmful that it justifies regulation.5 9 "The ques-
tion in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."60
The convoluted history of the clear and present danger test makes it dif-
ficult to assume that the test is applicable to a motion picture censorship or-
dinance. Two problems impede application of the test: (1) determining the
current formulation of the test and (2) evaluating whether this formula ap-
plies to entertainment as expression.6 1
The test in its metamorphosis from clear and present danger to the cur-
rent standard of inciting imminent lawless action 6 has been formulated and
"
8See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
59Mr. Justice Holmes, noting that "the most stringent protection of free speech would not
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic," first formulated the test for
recognizing such speech. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
"Ild.
"See generally EMERSON, supra note 21; M. SHAPIRO. FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME
COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1966); Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined: Dissonance
in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1970); Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and
Present Danger": From Schenck to Brandenburg-and Beyond, 1969 Sup. CT. REv. 41.
62When Mr. Justice Holmes first articulated the clear and present danger test in Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), he applied it to Schenck's conviction for violating the Es-
pionage Act of 1917 by distributing a leaflet concerning opposition to the draft. The creator of
the test further discussed it in his dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States. 250 U.S. 616
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Abrams is remembered not only for the marketplace of ideas con-
cept, but also for elevating the danger test from a rule of evidence to a constitutional level. Id. at
630. Abrams has thus been interpreted to mean that "for legislation to pass muster, it must be
demonstrated that a permissible objective of government is imminently and substantially
threatened." Strong, supra note 19, at 46. A few years later, Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925), attempted to limit the test to cases in which the statute was couched in nonspeech terms,
distinguishing such cases from those in which the statute by its terms prohibited certain speech.
The distinction was later eliminated yet may have influenced the growth of the test. See Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). Gitlow involved the statutory prohibition of advocacy of
criminal anarchy.
Mr. Justice Brandeis, who had earlier joined in Mr. Justice Holmes' dissent in Abrams, fur-
ther articulated the Holmes-Brandeis conception of the clear and present danger test in his con-
curring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of free and fearless
reasoning applied through the processes of popular government, no danger flowing
from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil ap-
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revised in the subversive speech context. However, it has been applied in
other contexts. For instance, the clear and present danger formulation was
applied in four cases involving contempt citations for the publication of
adverse comments on judicial behavior and pending cases.6 3
It has also been applied to speech evoking a hostile reaction from
listeners, 64 a factual situation somewhat analogous to that of evoking a hostile
prehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discus-
sion. If there be time be expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert
the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not
enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression....
Moreover, even imminent danger cannot justify resort to prohibition of these
functions essential to effective democracy unless the evil apprehended is relatively
serious.
Id. at 377. Miss Whitney was convicted of violating the Criminal Syndicalism Act of California
for assisting in the organization of the Communist Labor Party. Schenck, Abrams, Gitlow, and
Whitney thus all involved the application of the test in cases of speech as part of political action.
The "substantive evil" was subversion or overthrow of the government by unlawful means. Mr.
Justice Brandeis' words, quoted above, re-emphasize the political context in which the danger test
was employed.
The test was reformulated several years later and again applied to political speech. In Den-
nis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), the Court considered whether two sections of the Smith
Act, concerned with advocating the overthrow of the government by force, violated the first
amendment. Chief Justice Vinson rejected the Holmes-Brandeis test and replaced it with a for-
mulation by Judge Learned Hand. "In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravit of the
'evil' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid
the danger." Id. at 510. This Hand-Vinson formula has been much criticized; one writer terms it
"so pale in tone and so neutral in emphasis that it is hard to conceive of it as being used effec-
tively to control governmental power over expression." EMERSON, supra note 21, at 115. Another
notes that "Dennis has the dubious distinction of bringing to a head theparadox that the
Holmes-Brandeis formulation of the danger test as a constitutional solvent would satisfy but few
... . But to many it became, after Dennis, largely or wholly unsatisfactory because either too
virile or overly weak." Strong, supra note 69, at 53.
The most recent formula announced by th Court is in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969), another political speech case which reversed a conviction of a Ku Klux Klan spokesman
under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute. The court made reference to the Dennis case, yet
articulated its own test.
These later decisions have fashioned the principle that the constitutional guarantees of
free speech and free press do not permit a state to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the
use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.
Id. at 447.
'
5 Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pen-
nekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 311 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
"What finally emerges from the 'clear and present danger' cases is a working principle that
the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high
before utterances can be punished." Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. at 263. In Pennekamp v.
Florida, the Court found that there was a substantive evil in the disorderly and unfair ad-
ministration of justice. 328 U.S. at 335. However, no adequate showing of clear and present
danger was made in any of the four cases, and on this basis all the contempt citations were
reversed.
94The offense known as breach of the peace embraces a great variety of conduct destroy-
ing or menacing public order and tranquility. It includes not only violent acts but acts
and words likely to produce violence in others. No one would have the hardihood to
suggest that the principle of freedom of speech sanctions incitement to riot or that
religious liberty connotes the pritilege to exhort others to a physical attack upon those
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reaction from a movie spectator. In Terminiello v. Chicago,66 the test was ap-
plied in the case of a man charged with disorderly conduct. The speaker in
Terminiello addressed an audience of several hundred people inside an
auditorium, and his address stirred the crowd outside to anger. However, the
Supreme Court found no danger in the turbulent crowd; speech only becomes
nonprotected when "shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a
serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance,
or unrest. "6 6 If an angry, turbulent crowd does not constitute a "clear and
present danger," perhaps a passive audience of movie spectators may likewise
not rise to the danger level.
Utilized in the context of political advocacy, contempt of court, and
hostile audiences, the test, whether best phrased as clear and present, grave
and probable, or likely to produce imminent lawless action, is nevertheless
not easily applied to a new context. In fact, the several changes in the for-
mula indicate difficulty in applying it in its original context. Some would
limit the test to cases of subversive action and contempt of court;6 7 others
press for its total demise: "Since the test-whatever sense it may have made in
the limited context in which it originated-is clumsy and artificial when ex-
panded into a general criterion of permissible speech, the decline in its for-
tunes . . . seems to be an intellectual gain." 68
Notwithstanding these restrictive comments, use of the relatively recent
test in Brandenburg v. Ohio,69 suggest its viability in certain circumstances.
However, the revised formula must be applicable to the situation at hand. 0
belonging to another sect. When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, in-
terference with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to public
safety, peace, or order, appears, the power of the State to prevent or punish is ob-
vious.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940) (emphasis added).
65337 U.S. 1 (1949).
61d. at 5. Reversing the conviction on the grounds that the trial court construed the or-
dinance to permit the conviction if his speech merely "stirred people to anger, invited public
dispute, or brought about a condition of unrest," Justice Douglas explained that a conviction
resting on any of these grounds could not stand. "Speech is often provocative and challenging. It
may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for
acceptance of an idea." Id. at 4-5.
67Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amend-
ment, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1965).68Kalven, "Uninhibited, Robust, and Wide Open"-A Note on Free Speech and the War-
ren Court, 67 MIcH. L. REv. 289, 297 (1968). Kalven praised the Warren court for "the abroga-
tion of outmoded ideas," most significantly, "the great reduction in the status and prestige of the
clear-and-present danger test."
And Mr. Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion in Brandenburg, noted, "Though I
doubt if the 'clear and present danger' test is congenial to the First Amendment in time of a
declared war, I am certain that it is not reconcilable with the First Amendment in days of
peace." 395 U.S. at 452 (Douglas, J., concurring).
"In 1964, Kalven stated that "it is clear that, as of the judgment in the Times case, it has
disappeared." Kalven, supra note 43, at 16. Brandenburg was decided in 1969.
" The Brandenburg formula may be current, yet limited to its factual context-political
advocacy which incites listeners to unlawful action. But since the earlier versions of the test were
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And tests focusing on advocacy and incitement are ill-suited to motion pic-
tures as art or entertainment. Notes one commentor:
The emphasis is all on truth winning out in a fair fight between competing
ideas . . . Not all communications are relevant to the political process ...
Art and belles-lettres do not deal in such ideas . . . and it makes little sense
here to talk, as Mr. Justice Brandeis did in his great opinion in Whitney, of
whether there is still time for counter-speech. Thus there seems to be a hiatus
in our basic free-speech theory.
71
Such criticism alone need not preclude application of the test to art or
entertainment.7 2 If a test is to be utilized, it will presumably be the Branden-
burg formulation. 7" Translated into the context of movie censorship, under
Brandenburg, only violent movies that incite viewers to commit criminal acts
within a short time would be censored. Without reliable empirical proof of
the causation of antisocial conduct, a test resting on such proof would result
in automatic rejection of the Chicago ordinance or any comparable scheme. 74
Given the inadequacy of current attempts to show causation it is appropriate
to wait for such proof.
II. PERMITTING LIMITED CENSORSHIP TO PROTECT CHILDREN
Without hard empirical evidence to provide a distinction between films
which incite viewers to commit criminal acts and films which are harmless, it
is sound to deny constitutional validity to a general scheme for. censoring
violent motion pictures under any existing first amendment analysis. Never-
theless, narrow censorship confined to the protection of children may be con-
stitutional. The Supreme Court has signaled the acceptability of special pro-
developed in the political contest yet applied at least occasionally in other contexts, perhaps the
Brandenburg test too can be applied outside of the political organization scene. Hoever, by its
own terms, the test is limited to advocacy and incitement; in the words of the case, "the constitu-
tional guarantees . . . do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy . . . except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting . . . imminent lawless action . 5. " 395 U.S. at 447 (em-
phasis added). The obvious question, then is whether movie censorship can be assessed by a test
focusing on advocacy and incitement. Kinsley Int'l Pictures v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959),
warns that censorship laws cannot prevent the exhibition of a movie that advocates an idea-in
this case, that adultery may be proper under certain circumstances. The court seems to reason
that where advocacy of conduct falls short of incitement, regulation interferes with ideas. 360
U.S. at 688-89. The use of the language of "advocacy" and "incitement" in Kingsley may in-
dicate that a Brandenburg test is applicable to motion picture censorship.
"Kalven, supra note 21. at 16.
"See Buchanan, Obscenity and Brandenburg: The Missing Link?, 11 Hous. L. REv. 537,
570 (1974).
"See note 69 infra.
74Krislov suggests that those who oppose all obscenity regulation "adopt a thinly veiled form
of the same position by suggesting that publications may be censored only upon proof of a 'clear
and present danger' of an evil that rather self-evidently is not provable under present conditions
in the behavioral sciences." Krislov, supra note 15, at 155.
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tection for children from obscenity 75 and has offered a rough delineation of
variable obscenity, 76 which enables the state to regulate the dissemination of
materials to juveniles which it could not regulate as to adults. 7 7 It is con-
ceivable that similar variable definitions for censoring violence may be accep-
table. However, the case law precedents for variable obscenity have been
brought into question by a subsequent change in the definition of obscenity.78
The weak support offered by such cases is further diluted by the fact that the
cases address only the subject of obscenity and not that of violent expres-
sion.79
It is nevertheless well settled that more stringent controls on com-
municative materials available to youths may be utilized in certain contexts. 80
At the same time, it is only in relatively narrow and well-defined cir-
cumstances that the govermnent may bar such dissemination of protected
materials to minors.8 1 In other words, while recognizing that different stan-
dards may apply to legislation focused on minors, the Supreme Court has not
precisely articulated the differences8
In view of the lack of guidelines, it becomes a formidable task to create
legislation restricting dissemination of violent materials to minors which
"We recognize the legitimate and indeed exigent interest of States and local-
ities throughout the Nation in preventing the dissemination of material deemed harm-
ful to children .... State and local authorities might well consider whether ther objec-
tives in this area would be better served by law aimed specifically at preventing
distribution of objectionable material to children, rather than at totally prohibiting its
dissemination.
See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964)(Brennan, J., in dictum).
76Krislov, supra note 16; see also Note, For Adults Only: The Constitutionality of Govern-
mental Film Censorship by Age Classification, 69 YALE L.J. 141 (1959); Note, Private Censorship
of Movies, 22 STAN. L. REv. 618 (1970).
"See Rabeck v. New York, 391 U.S. 462 (1968); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas.
390 U.S. 676 (1968); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
"in Ginsberg v. New York, the Court adopted a variation of the adult obscenity standards
enunciated in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), and Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383
U.S. 413 (1966); however, the court abandoned the Roth-Memoirs test in Miller v. California.
"In Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 (1975), Mr. Justice Powell stated, "In Miller
v. California, sup-a, we abandoned the Roth-Memoirs test for judging obscenity with respect to
adults. We have not had occasion to decide what effect Miller will have on the Ginsberg formula-
tion. Erznoznik involved an ordinance making it punishable for a drive-in theater to exhibit films
containing nudity, when the screen is visible from the street. The ordinance was held invalid.
A Seventh Circuit case involving a similar ordinance addressed the question of whether a
city may go beyond the restrictions implicit in the concept of variable obscenity and concluded
that "a city may not, consonant with the First Amendment, go beyond the limitations inherent in
the concept of variable obscenity in regulating the dissemination to juveniles of 'objectionable'
material." Cinecom Theaters Midwest States, Inc. v. City of Fort Wayne, 473 F.2d 1297, 1203
(7th Cir. 1973).
104 2 2 U.S. at 212.
"
1Id. at 212-13.
82See generally Erzonznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1973); Tinker v. Des Moines
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Tinker is cited in Erzonoznik not only for the proposition that
"[iln most circumstances, the values protected by the First Amendment are no less applicable
when government seeks to control the flow of information to minors," 422 U.S. at 214, but also
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would survive a constitutional challenge, and it appears inevitable that such
legislation would be paticularly susceptible to a due process challenge on the
grounds of vagueness.8 3 Mr. Justice Marshall stated in Interstate Circuits8 that
the vice of vagueness is particularly pronounced where expression is sought to
be subjected to licensing.85 A licensing ordinance, even if confined to films
exhibited to youths, may well affect the marketability of films for adult au-
diences and as a consequence affect the first amendment interests of such
adults.8 6 Moreover, the permissible extent of vagueness is not a function of
the extent of the power to regulate or control expression with respect to
children; vagueness is not rendered less objectionable because the regulation
of expression is one of classification rather than direct suppression.8
7
Just as the Dallas licensing ordinance failed without narrowly drawn,
reasonable and definite standards for the officials to follow,88 so might the
for the assertion that first amendment rights of minors are not coextensive with those of adults.
Id. at n.11. Mr. Justice Stewart's concurring opinions in Tinker and Ginsberg are quoted for the
idea that a child is like someone in a captive audience, not possessed of full capacity for in-
dividual choice. Id. If a minor's viewing of a violent movie is "like someone in a captive au-
dience." it may qualify as one of the unnamed "precisely delineated areas" which may be
regulable. Id. The finding of mootness in Jacobs v. Board of School Comm., 490 F.2d 601 (7th
Cir. 1973), vacated as moot, 420 U.S. 128 (1975) may be another indication of a present interest
in avoiding difficult decisions on first amendment rights of children. Jacobs concerned a high
school underground newspaper. An earlier precedent for regulating matters where minors' first
amendment rights are involved is Prince v. Massachusetts, 31 U.S. 158 (1944), in which the
Court held that parents could not ignore child labor laws in order to distribute religious
literature. Prince can be interpreted as balancing first amendment rights with the concerns of
child labor laws. The Fifth Circuit opinion in Interstate Circuit, 366 F.2d 590 (1966), rev'd and
remanded, 390 U.S. 676 (1968), considered arguments based on Prince but rejected them in light
of the long history of the misuse of censorship.
8Censorship regulation must avoid the vices of vagueness and overbreadth. See Note, The
First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970); Note, The Void-for-
Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 167 (1960). The following are ex-
amples of censorship cases in which the vagueness doctrine has been used: Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) ("sacrilegious"); Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952) ("of such
character as to be prejudicial to the best interests of the people"); Superior Films, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Educ., 346 U.S. 587 (1954) ("tend to corrupt morals").
8
'See note 41 infra.
"Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 683 (1978).
"Thus, one who wishes to convey his ideas through that medium, which of course
includes one who is interested not so much in expression as in making money, must
consider whether what he proposes to film, and how he proposes to film it, is within
the terms of classification schemes such as this. If he is unable to determine what the
ordinance means, he runs the risk of being foreclosed, in practical effect, from a
significant portion of the movie-going public. Rather than run that risk, he might
choose nothing but the innocuous, perhaps save for the so-called "adult" picture.
Moreover, a local exhibitor who cannot afford to risk losing the youthful audience
when a film may be of marginal interest to adults-perhaps a "Viva Maria"-may
contract to show only the totally inane. The vast wasteland that some have described
in reference to another medium might be a verdant paradise in comparison. The First
Amendment interests here are, therefore, broader than merely those of the film maker,
distributor, and exhibitor, and certainly broader than those of youths under 16.
Id. at 684.
81d. at 688-89.
"Id. at 690.
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Chicago ordinance be fatally vague. 89 In the absence of clear-cut empirical
evidence or articulated standards of law, it follows that almost any legislative
attempt to impose restrictions on expression beyond the scope of obscenity or
variable obscenity would, in the words of the Supreme Court, set the censor
adrift upon a boundless sea. 90 Consequently, even if a form of censorship
limited to children is theoretically permissible, a sufficiently limited ordinance
may be impossible to draft or to apply, given the current lack of standards
inherent in any definition of violent media harmful to children.
CONCLUSION
Because empirical data cannot offer conclusive proof of either the
presence or absence of a causal connection between viewing violent movies
and the occurrence of serious antisocial behavior, and because legal
precedents are slim, carving out a new category of nonprotected expression is
not justifiable. In addition, it seems erroneous to conclude that lawless action
is imminent when empirical research denies such clarity. Although the state's
special interest in children may justify some very limited form of censorship
which would affect only minors, a sufficiently limited ordinance may be im-
possible to draft and impractical in application. As a model, the Chicago or-
dinance does not appear to be narrowly drawn and, therefore, if challenged
in court, may fail on grounds of vagueness. In the absence of ascertainable
standards, the risk of the censors intruding into protected speech looms too
large.
MARY B. COOK
"A judicial decison on the constitutionality of the Chicago ordinance may well rest on
grounds of vagueness. This was the approach of the Court in Interstate Circuit, in which Mr.
Justice Marshall discussed the vices of vagueness. He also noted,
Nor is it an answer to an argument that a particular regulation of expression is vague
to say that it was adopted for the salutary purpose of protecting children. The per-
missible extent of vagueness is not directly proportional to, or a function of, the extent
of the power to regulate or control expression with respect to children.
390 U.S. at 689.
The Chicago definition is indeed vague. Although the ordinance includes a lengthy list of
descriptive terms, the very inclusiveness of the list makes it difficult to tell what the prohibited
expression is supposed to be. Furthermore, the standard of lacking serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value is even more vague. This standard has been accepted in the area of
obscenity regulation, but it may not be found so acceptable in this new area. In addition to, or
instead of, being vague, the standard may be overbroad. If it invades areas of protected speech
or has a chilling effect, the ordinance may be invalid for facial overbreadth. Vagueness and
related overbreadth may, therefore, be the greatest weakness in the Chicago ordinance.
"Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. at 684.
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